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Privacy is important because it represents human dignity or the preservation of the ‘inner 
sanctum’. Due to technological developments the operational concerns of employers are 
continuously threatened or challenged by the employee’s right to privacy in the workplace. It is 
common knowledge that employees all over the world are exposed to numerous privacy invasive 
measures, including drug testing, psychological testing, polygraph testing, genetic testing, 
psychological testing, electronic monitoring and background checks. The issue at the heart of 
this dissertation is to determine to what extent privacy is protected in the South African 
workplace given advancements in technology and the implications (if any) for the right to 
privacy. A secondary aim of the dissertation is to attempt to provide a pragmatic balance 
between the privacy concerns of employees and the operational needs of employers in this 
technological age. This dissertation mainly focuses on the invasion of privacy in the workplace 
through the monitoring of focus areas of email, internet and telephone correspondences of the 
employee.  To provide an answer to the research issue discussed above, this dissertation 
addresses four ancillary or interrelated issues. First, the broad historical development of the legal 
protection of privacy is traced, examined and a workable definition of privacy is identified with 
reference to academic debate and comparative legislative and judicial developments. Secondly 
legislation on the regulation of monitoring in the workplace is critically examined and discussed. 
Thirdly, those reasons and practices, which threaten privacy in the employment sphere, are 
identified and briefly discussed. More specifically, the dissertation considers how these reasons 
and practices challenge privacy, the rationale for their existence and, if applicable, how these 
reasons and practices may be accommodated while simultaneously accommodating both privacy 
and the legitimate concerns of employers. Fourthly, a detailed evaluation of the case law and 
judicial developments of South Africa on the right to privacy in the workplace are examined so 
as to seek a balance if any between the employee’s right to privacy and the employer’s right to 
monitor. To successfully tackle the above issues the dissertation uses the conventional legal 
methodology associated with relative legal research, which includes a literature review of 






TABLE OF CONTENTS        PAGE 
 
Chapter 1: The right to Privacy 
1. Introduction .                               6 
1.1 Background:                                                                                                   6 
1.2 Meaning of Privacy                                                                                       7 
1.3 Constitutional Right to Privacy:                               9 
 
1.4 Limitation of the right to privacy                              14 
 
Chapter 2: Legislation on Monitoring 
2. Introduction.                                 19 
2.1 The Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act 127 of 1992                 19 
 
2.2 The Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-Related 
Information Act 70 of 2002                                                 22 
2.3 Electronic Communication and Transactions Act 25 of 2002.                          26 
2.4 The Electronic Communications and Transactions Act Amendment Bill 2012.            28 
 
2.5 Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013.                                                            30 
Chapter 3: Reasons why the employer monitors the internet, email and telephone 
corresponding of the employee 
3. Introduction                   .          36 
3.1 Vicarious liability                              36 
3.2 Defamation                                38 
3.3 Sexual Harassment and Discrimination                              40 
5 
 
3.4. Gender and Racial Issues                               43 
3.5. Viewing of Pornography                              44 
3.6. Intellectual Property                               46 
3.7. Performance Monitoring                              46 
3.8. Personal use                              47 
 
Chapter 4: Case law on the monitoring of employees in the workplace 
4. Introduction                              50 
4.1 Cases heard under the Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act 127 of 1992            50 
 
4.2 Cases heard under The Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of 
Communication-Related Information Act (RICPCIA)                              55 
4.3Most recent cases on monitoring pending the implementation of the Protection of Personal 
Information Bill of 200964 
Chapter 5: Conclusion 
Conclusion                                             68 










Chapter 1: The right to Privacy 
1. Introduction 
Privacy notions are deep rooted in history but privacy protection as a public policy question is a 
modern notion. The right to privacy is one of the most important rights and is recognized all over 
the world in diverse religions and cultures but it is not an absolute right because it can be limited 
according to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa; hence that’s where the employer’s 
right to monitor gets favour from. Privacy is a valuable and advanced aspect of personality. The 
right to privacy is now provided for in the Constitution but in the past it was provided for 
through other rights like the right to dignity. 
1.1 Background: 
The right to privacy is not a new legal concept in South Africa. Before this right came into being, 
decisions supporting privacy were based on property rights and contract because an independent 
right to privacy was not recognized. “Privacy is the right to be left alone; the most 
comprehensive right and the most valued by civilized men'- a legal shield which could be 
asserted by the individual against the prying eyes of the public”. 1 This became the same 
proposition in our courts through the case of,O’Keeffe v Argus Printing and Publishing Co. Ltd 
and Others.2 The modern law of invasion of privacy arose from a need to protect the individual’s 
dignity and mental tranquillity in a sophisticated and developed society where technology has 
enabled the former boundaries of privacy to be invaded.3 
 
The Constitution of South Africa is partially new and explicitly protects the right to privacy. 
Before the Constitution came into force, the right to privacy had always been and is still 
protected at common law. The right to privacy was protected at common law under personality 
rights and the available remedy was under actio injuriarum, which provided that, for one to get 
relief, the act complained of must have been wrongful, intentional and violated one or other real 
rights related to personality which every free man was entitled to enjoy.4 It took time for the 
                                                          
1Olmstead v The United States 277 US 4381927. 
2O’Keeffe v Argus Printing and Publishing Co. Ltd and Others 1954 (3) SA 244 (C). 
3A Cockhead. “A Critical Analysis of Law of Privacy with Reference to Invasion of Privacy of Public Figures. 
(1990) pg 5. 
4R v Umfaan 1908 TS 62. 
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legal system to establish a right to privacy that was not intertwined with personality rights. 
Judgments which provided for privacy were limited to the right to dignity, honour and self-
respect. In the S v A case5 Botha AJ stated that, the right to privacy is included in the concept 
ofdignitas and the infringement of a person’s privacy prima facie constitutes an impairment of 
his dignitas. This was the same reasoning in the O’Keeffe6case which held that, “the unlawful 
publication of a person’s photograph and name for advertising purposes constituted an 
aggression upon the person’s dignitas.” This serves as proof to confirm that before the 
constitution came into being, the right to privacy was provided for under the right to dignity. 
 
1.2 Meaning of Privacy: 
The right to privacy is intertwined with the right to dignity that’s why it is fundamental to both 
the social and personal development of an individual. This right concerns a person’s choice of 
whether he/she wants to allow others to know about his/her activities.This right involves 
protection against infringement from other people and even against the state. Remp maintains 
that, 
Privacy refers to the social balance between an individual’sright to keep information confidential and the 
societal benefit derived from sharing information, and how this balance is codified to give individuals the 
means tocontrol personal information.7 
 
The right to privacy in the context of the employment relationship is unique and very difficult to 
clarify. On the one hand, the employee has a right to privacy but he or she is supposed to be 
honest and loyal, especially during working hours, and stands in a relationship of trust with his or 
her employer.8 There are a number of theories of privacy, although the definitions of privacy are 
not all encompassing Tavani9 proposes that privacy is, “in a situation with regard to others [if] 
in that situation the individual ... is protected from intrusion, interference, and information 
access by others”.The South Africa Constitution on the other hand defines privacy or 
                                                          
51971 (2) SA 293 (T). 
61954 (3) SA 244 (C).  
7 M Remp Ann. The 2/" Century: Meeting the Challenges to Business Education (1999) pg 117. 
8A Dekker. Vices or Devices” Employee Monitoring in The Workplace (2004) 16 SA Merc LJ pg 622, 625.  
9H.T Tavani. 2007. ‘Philosophical theories of privacy: Implications for an adequate online privacy policy’, 
Metaphilosoph, 38(1): 1-22. pg 10 
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“Informational Privacy” or “Data Protection as: “... the right not to have their person or home 
searched, their property searched, their possessions seized or the privacy of their 
communications infringed.”10 Informational privacy is, therefore, achieved when one has control 
of his or her personal information.11According to McQuoid – Mason, most of the definitions are 
synonymous with amongst others “solitude”, “anonymity and reserve”, “intimacy” and “being let 
alone”.12 The definitions are argued to be useless in that they do not shed light as to when a court 
is willing to consider an invasion to the right to privacy.13 
 
They are instances which amount to a breach of privacy in terms of the common law for 
example: entry into private residence, the reading of private documents, the disclosure of private 
facts acquired through an unlawful intrusion and the disclosureof private facts in breach of 
confidentiality.14The Constitution, primarily conceives of privacy as the limited access to the self 
and the control over information about oneself.15 In Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic 
Offences v Hyundai MotorDistributors16 the Constitutional Court described privacy as, “ the 
right to be let alonewhen it pointed out that individuals did not lose their right to privacy once 
they venturedoutside the “truly personal realm” and “inner sanctum” because privacy protects 
people not places”.Furthermore another case described privacy as the right to be left alone,which 
went beyond being “a negative right to occupy a space free from governmentintrusion” but also 
protected personhood.17 Both cases were emulating one and the same thing that the right to 
privacy does not only apply to one’s private life but in society also. 
 
Neethling18 on the other hand states that, “Privacy is an individual condition of life characterised 
by exclusion from publicity. This condition includes all the personal facts which the person 
himself at the relevant time determines to be excluded from the knowledge of outsiders and in 
                                                          
10S Eiselen, A Roos , T Pistorius & D Van der Merwe. (2006). Information and communications technology law. 
Durban: LexisNexis pg 353. 
11 Ibid 
12 McQouid – Mason. The Law of Privacy in South Africa (1978) 98 – 99. 
13 Ibid. 
14Bernstein v Bester NO 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) 784. 
15 M, Gondwe. The Protection of Privacy in the Workplace: A Comparative Study. (2011) Published dissertation for 
a Degree of Doctor of Law at Stellenbosch University. page 130 
16Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors 2000 (10) BCLR 1079 (CC). 
17National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) 60 D – E.  
18Neethling et al Neethling's Law of Personality (1996)  pg 36.  
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respect of which he evidences a will for privacy.” The definitions of privacy are in harmony on 
the fact that privacy is protection of personal information that one does not want to be known by 
others. Cockhead19 maintains that it would appear like this definitions of the modern law of 
invasion of privacy, arose out of a need to protect the individual's dignity and mental tranquillity 
of people in a sophisticated and developing society where technology has enabled the former 
boundaries of privacy to be invaded. Cockhead20 fails to illustrate that the above will apply when 
one has a legitimate expectation to privacy. InNational Media Ltd v Jooste21it was held that, 
privacy is an individual condition of life characterised by exclusion from the public and publicity 
which embraces all those personal facts which the person concerned has determined to be 
excluded from the knowledge of outsiders and in respect of which he/she has the will that they 
be kept private. 
 
 
1.3 Constitutional Right to Privacy: 
 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa section 14 provides that, 
 
Everyone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have- 
   
 (a)   their person or home searched; 
 (b)   their property searched; 
 (c)   their possessions seized; or 
 (d)   the privacy of their communications infringed.22 
 
 
Section 14 is said to protect against two types of privacy infringements, ‘‘The first part 
guarantees a general right to privacy, the second part protects against specific infringements of 
privacy, namely searches and seizures and infringement of the privacy of 
                                                          
19A Cockhead.  A Critical Analysis of Law of Privacy With Reference To Invasion Of Privacy Of 
Public Figures. (1990) 5. 
20Ibid. 
21National Media Ltd v Jooste 1996 (3) SA 262 (A). 
22The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996: s 14. 
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communications”.23Although the Constitution provides for the right to privacy, for the section to 
apply to any individual that person must have a legitimate expectation of his/her right to privacy 
being upheld. It is said that section 14 protects information to the extent that it limits the ability 
to gain, publish, disclose or use information about others.24The second part is a subordinate of 
the first part in that for constitutional protection to arise one has to furnish proof that the 
infringement of the specific types of privacy emulated from infringement of the general right to 
privacy. A legitimate expectation of privacy is subjective in nature but the society must 
recognize it to be objectively reasonable.25 The subjective nature of the expectation entail that no 
one should expect their right to privacy to be upheld if they have consented implicitly or 
explicitly to its invasion.26 It has been argued that the fact that an employee has signed a contract 
with his employer may be regarded as implied consent that he/she will adhere to all company 
policies including the policy to monitor all employee electronic transmissions.27 
 
In my opinion, it is hard for one to satisfy what the society can call being objectively reasonable 
because there is no set rule of it and society itself comprises of individuals with different 
expectations that cannot be reconciled as one if they are no set rules to follow. The Bernstein28 
case tried to shade light as to what society can regard as being an objectively reasonable 
expectation of privacy, 
 
The truism that no right is to be considered absolute implies that from the outset of interpretation, each 
right is always limited by every other right accruing to another citizen. In the context of privacy this would 
mean that it is only the inner sanctum of a person, such as his/her family life, sexual preferences and home 
environment which is shielded from erosion by conflicting lights of the community. This implies that 
community lights and the rights of fellow members place a corresponding obligation on a citizen, thereby 
shaping the abstract notion of individualism towards identifying a concrete member of civil society. 
Privacy is acknowledged in the truly personal realm but as a person moves into communal relations and 
activities such as business and social interaction, the scope of the personal space shrinks accordingly.29 
 
                                                          









This statement illustrate that there is plenty of room for the right of privacy to be infringed in 
open society because what the society regards as objectively reasonable must mainly conform to 
the convictions of that society and since individualism is shunned a person’s personal right to 
privacy can be easily disregarded unless it concerns things which don’t involve society 
intimately. The exercise of one’s right to privacy in the public realm means there is more room 
that right will be infringed and there is no guarantee that your right will be upheld against the 
other individual’s right to whom you are in conflict with. When one waives his/her legitimate 
expectation to privacy Currie & De Waal states that the test to be applied is what is reasonable 
pursuant to the values that” link the standard of reasonableness.30 I am afraid this does not shade 
more light into what is an objectively reasonable expectation. Neethling maintains that, "the 
acquaintance with private facts should not only be contrary to the subjective determination and 
will of the prejudiced party, but at the same time, viewed objectively, also be unreasonable or 
contrary to the legal convictions of the community”.31 This is the position according to common 
law. In Bernstein v Bester32 the right to privacy was characterised as lying along a range, where 
the more a person interrelates with the world, the more the right to privacy becomes attenuated. 
 
It is only the inner sanctum of a person that is truly protected from privacy. This was the idea 
emulated in the Bernstein case and it was the same proposition emphasized in the Case v 
Minister of Safety and Security33 case which held that, 
 
What erotic material I may choose to keep within the privacy of my home, and only for my personal use 
there, is nobody's business but mine. It is certainly not the business of society or the state. Any ban imposed 
on my possession of such material for that solitary purpose invades the personal privacy which s 13 of the 
Interim Constitution guarantees that I shall enjoy. 
 
The Bernstein34case held that, a very high level of protection should be given to the individual’s 
intimate personal sphere of life and the maintenance of its basic preconditions, and that there was 
a final untouchable sphere of human freedom that was beyond any interference from any public 
                                                          
30 Currie & de Waal (2005) Bill of Rights Handbook .pg 317 , 318. 
31 J Neethling. Personality rights: A comparative overview CISA Vol 38(2) July 2005. 
32Bernstein v Bester NO 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) 784. 
33Case v Minister of Safety and Security 1996 (3) SA 617 (CC) para 91. 
34Bernstein v Bester NO 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) 784. 
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authority. Langa DP elaborated on the above by clearly stating that the right to privacy does not 
relate solely to the individual within his or her intimate sphere.35 He further said that, when 
people are in their offices or in their cars or on mobile telephones they still retain a right to be 
left alone by the State unless certain conditions are satisfied.36 When a person has the ability to 
decide what he or she wishes to disclose to the public and has a reasonable expectation that such 
a decision will be respected, the right to privacy will come into play.37 Ackerman J in contrast to 
the above held that , this inviolable core to a legitimate expectation of privacy is left behind once 
an individual enters into relationships with persons outside this closest intimate sphere; the 
individual’s activities then acquire a social dimension and the right of privacy in this context 
becomes subject to limitation.38 It is important to note that a person’s legitimate expectation to 
privacy does not extend to unlawful activities done in private. The Jordan39 case is authority on 
this, as Ngcobo J said, 
 
I do not accept that a person who commits a crime in private, the nature of which can only be committed in 
private, can necessarily claim the protection of the privacy clause…The law should be as concerned with 
crimes that are committed in private as it is with crimes that are committed in public. 
 
Dekker40 maintains that, the infringement of the right to privacy can sometimes be justifiable in 
the context of the employment relationship. To determine justifiability, it is necessary to balance 
the competing interests of the employer (the right to economic activity) and the employee (the 
right to privacy).41 Under the interim Constitution, the right to privacy could be restricted if it 
was reasonable and justifiable, and if the restriction did not negate the essential content of the 
right.42 The limitation clause provided for certain levels of scrutiny, in terms of which stronger 
protection was awarded to certain rights. 43The right to privacy did not fall within that category, 
                                                          
35Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences and Others v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and 
Others: In Re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others v Smit NO and Others 2001 1 SA 545 (CC). 
36 Ibid 
37 Ibid 
38Bernstein v Bester NO 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) 784. 
39S v Jordan and Others (Sex Workers Education and Advocacy Task Force and Others as Amici Curiae 2002 6 SA 
642 (CC). 
40 A Dekker. Vices or Devices” Employee Monitoring in The Workplace (2004) 16 SA Merc LJ pg 622, 625. 





and so a restriction of the right to privacy had only to be reasonable and justifiable. 44  An 
infringement would be reasonable if the interest underlying the limitation is of sufficient 
importance to outweigh the constitutionally protected right and the means must be proportional 
to the objective of the limitation.45 
 
Chatfield & Hakkila 46  submit that, in the context of mobile phone communications, users 
consider their mobile phones personal and private; same as a handbag or a wallet.This is the case 
because it has been found that users perceived voice communications, emails, pictures and Short 
Message Services (SMS’s) have different levels of privacy. 47 As signified in the previous 
paragraph, the Constitutional Court perceives an individual’s expectation of privacy as a 
continuum with one’s personal and intimate life at the one end and communal or business life at 
the other end.48 A person’s expectation of privacy decreases along the continuum as one moves 
further away from his/her personal domain.49 Both employers and employees have a right to 
privacy that is recognized by the Constitution of South Africa.50 Lease51 is of the idea that, 
employers have legitimate requirements for wanting to monitor or intercept employees’ personal 
communications which take place in the general course of business. In contrast, the 
Constitutional Court points out that an employee cannot be expected to have no right to privacy 
in the workplace.52 Furthermore, employees will always be entitled to some level of privacy, 
meaning that the employer cannot force an employee to relinquish all rights to privacy. 53 
Therefore, there is need for the employer to clearly differentiate between what is considered 
private and what is considered business related data.54 The difference in expectations of privacy 
between personally-owned devices and organisation-owned devices therefore means that 
                                                          
44A Dekker. Vices or Devices” Employee Monitoring in The Workplace (2004) 16 SA Merc LJ pg 622, 625. 
45 Ibid. 
46 C Chatfield. & J Hakkila. 2005. ‘It’s like if you opened someone else’s letter — User perceived privacy and social 
practices with SMS communication’. In Proceedings of the seventh international conference on human computer 
interaction with mobile devices and services, Salzburg, Austria, pg219, 222. 
47 Ibid. 
48 S Eiselen, A Roos, T Pistorius & D Van der Merwe. (2006). Information and communications technology law. 
Durban: LexisNexis.pg 353 
49 Ibid. 
50 D, Collier. 2002. ‘Workplace privacy in the cyber age’, Industrial Law Journal, 23: pg 1743-1759. 
51 D, Lease. 2005. ‘Balancing productivity and privacy: Electronic monitoring of employees.’ Paper presented at the 
European Management and Technology Conference, Rome, Italy, June 2005. 





theorganisation’s computer usage policies cannot be extended to include personally-owned 
devices.55 A separate policy that specifically caters for the unique characteristics of personally-
owned devices should be drafted. 
 
To determine whether the right to privacy has been infringed, a balance must bestruck between 
the right of individuals to be left alone and the right of the State toinfringe the individual’s 
privacy in order to achieve some State objective, forexample, crime prevention. The 
Constitutional Court adopted the view, as espoused by the United States, that individuals retain 
the right ‘to be left alone’ by the state unless certain conditions are met.56Further in Mistry v 
Interim Medicaland Dental Council of South Africa and Others57 it was held that the more public 
theundertaking and the more closely it would be regulated, the more attenuatedwould the right to 
privacy be and the less intense any possible invasion. 58  In developing interception and 
monitoring legislation consistent with the valuesof the Constitution, there must be a balance 
between the need to make legislativeprovision equipping law-enforcement with the means to 
combat crime and theneed to retain a modicum of privacy of communications.59 
 
 
1.4 Limitation of the right to privacy 
 
The right to privacy is not an absolute right; it is subject to limitation just like other rights in 
Chapter 2 of the Constitution. These rights are subject to limitation under section 36 of the 
Constitution which provides for a test that has to be satisfied in order for an infringement on a 
right to be allowed. The right to privacy is subject to limitation by a law of general application to 
the extent that it is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society, based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors including those mentioned 
in the section. S v Makwanyane60is a landmark case on the issue of how, when and why the 
                                                          
55 P, Hunter. 2007. ‘Is now the time to define a mobile security policy’, Computer Fraud and Security, 6: pg10-12. 
56 1991 2 SA 117 (W). 
57Mistry v Interim  Medical and Dental Council of South Africa  1998 (4) SA 1127 (CC) ;1998 (7) BCLR 880 (CC).  
58Mistry v Interim Medical and Dental Council of South Africa 1998 (4) SA 1127 (CC) para 27. 
59Ibid. 
60S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC); 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC). 
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Constitutional court will allow a limitation of a right. In the Makwanyane case the constitutional 
court held as follows, 
 
The limitation of constitutional rights for a purpose that is reasonable and necessary in a democratic society 
involves the weighing up of competing values, and ultimately an assessment based on proportionality. This 
is implicit in the provisions of s33 (1) (lC). The fact that different rights have different implications for 
democracy, and In the case of our constitution for an open and democratic society based on freedom and 
equality', means that there is no absolute standard which can be laid down for determining reasonableness 
and necessity. Principles can be established, but the application of those principles to particular 
circumstances can only be done on a case by case basis. This is inherent in the requirement 
ofproportionality, which calls for the balancing of different interests. In thebalancing process, the relevant 
considerations will include the nature of thelight that is limited and the importance to an open and 
democratic societybased on freedom and equality; the purpose for which the light is limited andthe 
importance of that purpose to such a society; the extent of the limitation,its efficacy and particularly where 
the limitation has to be necessary, whetherthe desired ends could reasonably be achieved through other 
means lessdamaging to the light in question. In the process regard must be had to theprovisions of s33(1) 
(IC), and the underlying values of the Constitution,bearing in mind that, as a Canadian Judge has said, 'the 
role of the Court is notto second-guess the wisdom of policy choices made by the legislators.61 
 
The court in S v Makwanyane62 was basically elaborating on the test set out in section 36 of the 
Constitution although when the case was heard the limitation clause was section 33 of the 
Interim Constitution. It also emphasized that they cannot be any set rules as to when a court will 
allow for the limitation of a right but every case will have to be examined according to its own 
merits and limitation must be sought when other solutions have been attempted and failed. 
Section 36 of the Constitution lays out the test for limitation as follows, 
 
(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the extent 
that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including- 
         (a) the nature of the right; 
         (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
       (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
         (d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 





         (e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
           (2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution, no law may limit any 
right entrenched in the Bill of Rights.63 
 
S v Bhulwana64 sums up the provisions of the limitations clause by saying, 
 
In sum, therefore, the court places the purpose, effects and importance of the infringing legislation on one 
side of the scales and the nature and effect of the infringement caused by the legislation on the other. The 
more substantial the inroad into fundamental lights, the more persuasive the grounds of justification must 
be.65 
 
A right can be limited if the limitation is authorised by a law of general application and as so far 
as it is justifiable ina democratic society based on the criteria set out in subsection 36(1) (a)-(e). 
The National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and 
Others66is authority on the fact that the court can hold a limitation to be unjustifiable if it is a 
sever limitation on a right and if the limitation itself serves no valid purpose. Ultimately 
therefore, the purpose of any given law will be weighed up against the importanceof the 
fundamental right that it stands to infringe.67The Moonsamy68 case held that, 
 
The rights that a citizen is entitled to in his or her personal life cannot simply disappear in his or her 
professional life as a result of the employer's business necessity. At the same time the employer's business 
necessity might legitimately impact on the employee's personal rights in a manner not possible outside the 
workplace. Therefore there is a clear balancing of interests.69 
 
This case highlights that the fact that an employer may have company policy that allows for the 
monitoring of the employees electronic transmissions does not mean it’s a valid limitation of the 
employees right to privacy and workplace policy does not extend to one’s social life outside the 
workplace. The employee’s expectation of privacy will have to be weighed against the 
                                                          
63Act 108 of 1996: s 36. 
64 (1996) 1 (SA) 388 (CC). 
65S v Bhulwana (1996) 1 (SA) 388 (CC) para 18. 
66 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC). 
67 W Beech. "Right of Employer to Monitor Employees' Electronic Mail, Telephone Calls, Internet Usage and other 
Recordings" 2005 (26) Industrial Law Journal pg 655. 
68 (1999) 20 ILJ 464 (CCMA). 
69Moonsamy v The Mailhouse(1999) 20 ILJ 464 (CCMA) at 471G. 
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employer’s expectation to protect his business interests. From the employer’s perspectives it 
seems as privacy is not an absolute right because it is his/her equipment that is being used by the 
employee and he has to protect his/her business from viruses, excessive use and cyber loafing 
which implies the employees omission to do assigned work.70It is from the same reasoning that 
Le Roux71 states, 
 
The employer is also permitted to set more general standards relating to conduct in the work place and to 
the use of equipment and tools. The employer can, for example, prescribe when personal computers may be 
used, for what purposes they may be used, and how they may be used. The same applies to access to the 
Internet. If an employee fails to comply with these rules it will, in principle, be open to the employer to 
discipline an employee for such a failure. In the correct circumstances this may also justify the disciplinary 
sanction of dismissal. 
 
The employer has a right to protect his property, interests and to operate an effective and 
efficient business through limitation of the employee’s right to privacy. 72The employer also has 
a duty upon him to make sure he is operating his business in a safe and non-discriminatory 
environment.73 The misuse of the employer’s electronic transmission equipment in the workplace 
poses a lot of risk for the employer hence the employee’s right to privacy has to be limited. The 
misuse of e-mail for private purposes may increase the employer's overhead costs, cause 
communication delays and even blockages of communication systems.74 
 
In conclusion according to what was discussed in this chapter, the right to privacy is mainly 
protected when one has got a reasonable/legitimate expectation to expect that his/her right must 
be observed in a given situation. The right to privacy has been developed on a case-by-case basis 
with the content of the right being defined differently and whether the right to privacy trumps the 
employer’s right to monitor depends also on a case-by-case basis as discussed in this chapter. 
                                                          
70 T Pistorious. Monitoring, interception and Big Boss in the workplace: is the devil in the details? (2009) 
PER vol.12 no.1 Potchefstroom.  pg 3. 
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Chapter 2:Legislation on Monitoring 
2. Introduction 
Together with the Constitutional provisions mentioned in chapter 1, there are a number of pieces 
of legislation which protect (and protected) the individual right to privacy in their 
communications by regulating the monitoring of Internet, telephone and E-mail communications 
in a direct or indirect fashion. Some of these legislations have now been repealed but are relevant 
to this paper so as to trace how legislation has evolved over the years so as to cater for the needs 
of the employee’s right to privacy. 
2.1 The Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act (IMP) 127 of 1992: 
The Act came into effect in February 1993, prior to the enactment of the Interim Constitution 
(1993). The stated purpose of the Act is both to prohibit the interception and monitoring of 
certain communications, and to provide for authorisation to do so in certain circumstances. 
As indicated in its long title, the IMP Act is directed at prohibiting the interception of certain 
communications, monitoring certain conversations or communications, providing mechanisms 
for the interception of postal articles and communications as well as the monitoring of 
conversations or communications when a serious offence is committed or the security of South 
Africa is threatened. It states that its purpose is, 
 
[to] prohibit the interception of certain communication and the monitoring of certain conversations or 
communication; to provide for the interception of postal articles and communications and for the 
monitoring of conversations or communication in the case of a serious offence of if the security of the 
Republic is threatened.75 
The purpose statement itself is proof enough that it applied to specific communications which 
were telephone and postal communications. The primary objective of the IMP Act is not crime 
prevention but the protection of confidential information from illicit eavesdropping.76 
Section 2(1) of the IMP Act provides for the prohibition of interception and monitoring. This 
section states that: 
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No person shall intentionally and without the knowledge or permission of the dispatcher intercept a 
communication which has been or is being or is intended to be transmitted by telephone or any other 
manner over a telecommunication line; or intentionally monitoring any conversation or communication by 
means of a monitoring device so as to gather confidential information concerning any person, body or 
organization.77 
 
In order to understand the extent of this prohibition we will have to consult the definitions of 
certain words in the provision. A 'telecommunication line' is extremely widely defined to include 
any apparatus, instrument, pole, mast, wire, pipe, pneumatic, or other tube, thing means which is 
or may be used for or in connection with the sending, conveying or transmitting or receiving of 
signs, signals, sounds, communication or other information.78This definition can be said to have 
been phrased wider than the purpose to include the electronic equipment, linking and distribution 
systems that serve to connect computers to one another. 
A 'monitoring device’ is defined as 
[A]ny instrument, device or equipment which is used or can be used, whether by itself or in combination 
with any other instrument, device or equipment, to listen to or record any conversation or communication.79 
The prohibition contained in section 2(1)of IMP Act which relates to 'no person' and since the 
term is not defined in any manner can therefore be given its ordinary meaning to include, an 
employee(whether a natural or juristic person) or a representative of the employee. A judge has 
authority to give permission to monitor but must be convinced that a serious offence has been or 
is being or will be committed and cannot be investigated in any other manner.80 The offence 
under investigation must have been committed over a lengthy period of time, on an organised or 
regular basis, or harm the country’s economy.81 A judge may only direct the interception or 
monitoring of an article or communication for three months at a time.82 Any member of the 
SAPS executing a direction may enter into any premises to install a monitoring device, or to 
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intercept a postal article or communication.83Van Dokkuln84states that it is doubtful that this Act 
was ever intended to be used in the civil litigation context. Section 3 (2) of the IMP Act provides 
that any application to a judge for a directive shall be made by a police officer, or an army 
officer, or to member of the intelligence service.85 Hefurther states that it would seem to be a 
clear indication that the IMP Act was intended to be used by only the police or the military, 
including the intelligence services and is not concerned with the interception or monitoring in the 
private sphere but is rather concerned with the gathering of evidence by public agencies during 
the investigation of a crime.86 
 
Section 8 of the IMP Act provides for offences and penalties to those who contravened the 
provisions of section 2(1) of this Act. Offences and penalties are there to prevent violation of the 
Act's general provisions (section 2) or the secrecy provisions. A fine or imprisonment for a 
period not exceeding two-years is contemplated for violating section 2, and in the case of the 
`secrecy clause' contravention, a fine or imprisonment not exceeding five-years can be 
imposed.87 The importance of obtaining the proper authority to monitor or intercept with strict 
adherence to procedure has been stressed in our courts and the validity of the directive can be 
automatically vitiated if not lawfully issued. This would not only constitute a criminal offence in 
terms of the Act, but also constitute an infringement of the right to privacy, which includes the 
right not to be subject to "the violation of private communications", as set out above.88 
 
 
The South African Law Commission was of the view that since the promulgation of the ( (IMP) 
Act, 127 of 1992 on 1 February 1993, there had been an increase in the use of advanced 
telecommunications technologies, including cellular communications, satellite communications, 
computer communications through e-mail, as well as the electronic transfer of information and 
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data. 89  Furthermore, the considerable legal developments across the world regarding the 
interception of communications made a review of the IMP Act necessary.90 The SALC was of 
the view that even though the IMP Act compares favourably with its counterparts in other 
countries, it does not deal adequately with new technology (eg, the IMP Act does not deal with 
the monitoring of employees’ e-mail by employers).91 For that reason the SALC recommended 
that it be substantially repealed and replaced with new legislation. 
 
2.2. The Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-
Related Information Act 70 of 2002 
 
The Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication – Related 
Information Act (“RICPCIA”), also known to others as (RICA), IMP’s successor, is concerned 
with interception in both the private and public spheres and applies to private sector employees 
and employers. 
 
The scope of the application of RICA: 
 
• to regulate the interception of certain communications; 
• to monitor signals, radio frequency spectrum and the provision of communication-related 
information 
• to regulate the making of application for, and the issuing of, directions authorising the 
interception of   communications, entry warrants and the provision of communication-related 
information; 
• to prohibit the provision of telecommunication services that do not have the capability to be 
intercepted; 
• to provide for the establishment of interception centres, the Office for Interception Centres and 
the Internet Service Providers Assistance Fund; 
                                                          





• to create offences and to prescribe penalties for such offences.92 
 
The objectives of RICA are more far-reaching when compared with the IMP. Unlike the 
IMP, section 1 of RICA defines ‘communication’ as including both a direct communication 
(non-electronic) and an indirect communication (electronic).93It is clear from the objectives 
contained in RICA that, although its primary focus is assisting law-enforcement officers in 
procuring information required to combat crime, it also regulates interception and monitoring in 
the private sphere. 
 
Section 1 of RICA defines ‘intercept’ as  
 
the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any communication through the use of any means, including 
an interception device, so as to make some or all of the contents of the communication available to a person 
other than the sender or recipient or intended recipient of that communication and includes the  
 
• monitoring of any such communication by means of a monitoring device; 
• viewing, examination or inspection of the contents of any indirect communication; and 
• diversion of any indirect communication from its intended destination to another destination.94 
 
Section 2 of RICA provides that, no person may intentionally intercept or attempt to intercept or 
authorise or procure any other person to intercept or attempt to do so, at any place in South 
Africa, any communication in the course of its occurrence or transmission.95 Any interception in 
contravention to section 2 may constitute a criminal offence, which carries a maximum fine of 
two million rands or a maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years.96 
 
The same with the IMP, section 3(a) of RICA allows authorised persons to intercept any 
communication in accordance with an interception direction issued by a judge. Other exceptions 
to the prohibition of interception include: 
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• unintentional interception97 
• interception by a party to the communications98 
• interception with the written consent of one of the parties to the communications99 
• interception of indirect (electronic) communications in the carrying on of any 
business100 
• interception by certain law-enforcement personnel to prevent serious bodily harm101 
• interception by certain law-enforcement personnel to determine the location of a person 
in an emergency102 
• interception in a prison103 
• monitoring of signals by persons responsible for installing, operating and maintaining 
equipment in carrying out such duties104and 
• monitoring of the radio frequency spectrum by Icasa105 
 
Section 6(1) of RICA provides for exception and section 6(2) sets out conditions that have to be 
met before the exception applies. Section 6(1) states that any person may, in the course of 
carrying on any business, monitor, intercept or examine any indirect communications. This 
section limits the meaning of an indirect communication to, the means by which a transaction is 
entered into in the course of that business106 ,which otherwise relates to that business, 107 which 
otherwise takes place in the course of carrying on that business and in the course of its 
transmission over a telecommunication system.108Although section 6(1)(a) specifically refers to 
communication ‘by means of which a transaction is entered into’ and section 6(1)(b) specifically 
refers to communication that ‘relates’ to a business, section 6(1)(c) refers generally to 
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communication that takes place ‘in the course of carrying on of that business’.109 It is arguable 
that most (if not all) personal indirect communication of employees, employees make use of 
employers’ communications systems, fall within the exception set out in section 6(1)(c) of 
RICA. 
 
Section 6(2) (b) provides that a person may intercept an indirect communication as indicated 
above only if, the interception is for purposes of monitoring or keeping a record of indirect 
communications, in order to establish the existence of facts, for purposes of investigating or 
detecting the unauthorised use of the employer’s telecommunication system110 , or where it is 
undertaken in order to secure, or is an inherent part of the effective operation of such system.111 
Furthermore,  monitoring indirect communications made to a confidential voice-telephony 
counselling or support service which is free of charge, other than the cost, if any, of making a 
telephone call, and operated in such a way that users thereof may remain anonymous if they so 
choose.112 This does not place an onerous obligation on the employer, nor does it limit the 
exception very much. As long as an employer understands that it may intercept e-mail only for 
one or more of the stated purposes, there should be no problem in meeting the condition. Section 
6 specifically deals with the interception that occurs in connection with the carrying on of a 




RICA was drafted in response to the increasing diversity and developments in communication 
technologies, globalisation of the telecommunications industry, and the convergence of the 
telecommunications, broadcasting and information technology industries, which inter alia 
include satellites, optical fibres, computers, cellular technology, e-mail, surveillance equipment, 
and the electronic transfer of information and data. RICA sets out circumstances under which 
government entities and other persons may or must intercept or monitor conversations, cellular 
text messages, e-mails, faxes, data transmissions and postal articles, and establishes that in all 
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other circumstances, such interception or monitoring is prohibited. In permitting such 
interception and monitoring, it is arguable that RICA does not provide adequate safeguards to 
protect the privacy of employees in the workplace. This may result in a number of provisions of 
RICA being susceptible to constitutional challenge. There is also the danger that the invocation 
of the provisions of RICA, both in the employment context and by law-enforcement officers, 
may be abused in a manner that is inconsistent with the right to privacy and freedom of 
expression enshrined in the Constitution. RICA permits greater latitude for the interception and 
monitoring of communication than was permitted in the IMP Act. It makes detailed provision for 
the State to intercept and monitor communications. RICA also places onerous obligations 
(financial and otherwise) on the .private telecommunications industry to assist the State in its 
interception and monitoring of communications. 
 
2.4. Electronic Communication and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 
 
The main objective of the Electronic Communication and Transactions Act (ECTA) is ‘to enable 
and facilitate electronic communications and transactions in the public interest’. 113  The 
definitions of this act are essential to the research paper. ‘Electronic communications’ is defined 
in the ECT Act as ‘a communication by means of data messages’.114 In addition, ‘data’ is defined 
as ‘electronic representations of information in any form’. 115  ‘Transaction’ is defined as ‘a 
transaction of either a commercial or non-commercial nature, and includes the provision of 
information and government services’.116 The ECT Act does not limit the operation of any law 
that expressly authorizes, prohibits or regulates the use of data messages. 
 
The aims of the ECT Act, as provided for in section 2(1) are, inter alia: 
 
• to remove barriers to electronic communications and transactions in the 
Republic; 
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• to promote legal certainty and confidence in respect of electronic communications and 
transactions; 
• to promote technology neutrality in the application of legislation to electronic communications 
and transactions; and 
• to ensure that electronic transactions in the Republic conform to the highest international 
standards. 
 
‘Data message’ is defined as data generated, sent, received or stored by electronic means and 
includes voice where the voice is used in an automated transaction and a stored record.117Section 
15 of the ECT Act provides that: 
(1) In any legal proceedings, the rules of evidence must not be applied so as to deny the admissibility of a 
data message, in evidence — on the mere grounds that it is constituted by a data message; or if it is the best 
evidence that the person adducing it could reasonably be expected to obtain, on the grounds that it is not in 
its original form. 
(2) Information in the form of a data message must be given due evidential weight.118 
 
This signifies that e-mail messages have an evidential weight in both civil and criminal 
proceedings. 119  This is particularly important for employer — employee relations when the 
relationship terminates.120 Archived e-mail messages may come in useful as evidence for either 
the employer or the employee in workplace-related disputes.121 
 
Section 50(1) provides that the chapter on the protection of personal information applies only to 
personal information that has been obtained through electronic transactions.122 
 
Section 85 defines ‘cyber crime’ as the actions of a person who, after taking note of any data, 
becomes aware of the fact that he or she is not authorised to access that data and still continues to 
access that data.123 This is relevant to this discussion since cyber crime is one of the reasons why 
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employer monitors employee. Section 86(1) provides that, subject to the Interception and 
Monitoring Prohibition Act, 1992 (Act 127 of 1992), a person who intentionally accesses or 
intercepts any data without authority or permission to do so, is guilty of an offence.124In the case 
of Douvenga 125 the court had to decide whether an accused employee GM Douvenga of 
Rentmeester Assurance Limited (Rentmeester) was guilty of  contravention of section 86(1) 
(read with sections 1, 51 and 85) of the ECT Act. It was alleged in this case that the accused, on 
or about 21 January 2003, in or near Pretoria and in the district of the Northern Transvaal, 
intentionally and without permission to do so, gained entry to data which she knew was 
contained in confidential databases and/or contravened the provision by sending this data per e-
mail to her fiancée.126 In the Rabie127 case which was quoted by the Douvenga case it was held 
that, it seemed clear that an act done by a servant solely for his own interests and purposes, 
although occasioned by his employment, may fall outside the course or scope of his employment 
and that in deciding whether an act by the servant does fall within the course and scope of 
employment, some reference is to be made to the servant’s intention. The Douvenga case went 
on to hold that the accused could not give any explanation to the Court when asked about her 
reasons to access and send the information to another computer. 128  The Court therefore 
concluded that the accused was on a frolic of her own when she gained access to Rentmeester’s 
databases and that Rentmeester could therefore not be held responsible (vicariously liable) for 
her actions.129 The Court observed that the information remained confidential information that 
only Rentmeester had exclusive use over.130 It was further observed that the information and the 
data subject were attached to one another and had to be handled by the data controller in a 
manner that complies with section 51(4) of the ECT Act.131 The accused was found guilty of 
contravening section 86(1) of the ECT Act and sentenced to a R1 000 fine or imprisonment for a 
period of three months 
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2.5. The Electronic Communications and Transactions Act Amendment Bill 2012: 
 
The Electronic Communications and Transactions Act, 2002, (ECT), has been in place for a 
decade. During all this time, the ECT Act has functioned well in all areas, providing for 
consumer protection ahead of the introduction of the Consumer Protection Act, 2008, and 
heralding the important notions of privacy and data protection. Be that as it may, in the decade 
since its introduction, the world has seen significant changes in the electronic communications 
sector, affecting use of the internet. Social media over the internet and other forms of 
communications have revolutionized communication, removing physical barriers to 
communications and the sharing of information.132 As a consequence of the exponential growth 
in electronic transactions and our dependence on the internet, we have experienced a significant 
increase in hacking, security breaches, data mining for economic purposes, misuse of personal 
information, cyber security threats and cyber crime.133 
 
Chapter VIII deals with the protection of personal information. Much work has been done in 
relation to new legislation to deal with personal information and privacy and the protection of 
state information for example the Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013. As a result, 
this chapter has not been amended and awaits the new legislation. Section 50(2) of the ECT Act 
25 of 2002 which provides that the principles governing the processing of electronically 
collected personal information are voluntary has been amended in order to make the principles 
obligatory because the voluntary principles do not give effect to the right to privacy provided for 
in the Constitution. In relation to definitions, "personal information" has been amended to reflect 
the proposed definition in the new Bill on personal information.134 
 
2.6. Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013: 
 
Privacy and data protection legislation provides for the legal protection of a person in instances 
where his or her personal information is being collected, stored, used or communicated by 
another person or institution. The protection seeks to uphold the right to privacy as protected by 
                                                          





section 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution), and other 
International Human Rights instruments. The Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2014 
from here onwards written as (POPI) is, in many respects, similar to its United Kingdom (UK) 
counterpart, the Data Protection Act 29 of 1998 (DPA), which makes provision for the regulation 
of information relating to individuals, including the obtaining, holding and use or disclosure of 
such information. The DPA has dramatically affected the law in the UK and POPI is expected to 
have a similar effect in South Africa. Two of the main purposes of POPI are to give effect to the 
constitutional right to privacy(s 2(a)) and to regulate the manner in which personal information is 
processed (s 2(b)).135 POPI is an attempt to bring South Africa in line with global trends of data 
protection. 
 
Mention is only made to the definitions that are relevant to the scope of this paper. ‘Personal 
Information’ is defined as information relating to natural and juristic persons which includes: 
•information relating to the race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, nationality, ethnic or 
social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, physical or mental health, well-being, disability, 
religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth of the person; 
•information relating to the education or the medical, financial, criminal or employment history 
of the person; 
•any identifying number, symbol, e-mail address, physical address, telephone number or other 
particular assignment to the person; 
•the blood type or any other biometric information of the person; 
•the personal opinions, views or preferences of the person; 
•correspondence sent by the person that is of a private or confidential nature; 
•the views or opinions of another individual about the person; and 
•the name of the person if it appears with other personal information relating to the person or if 
the disclosure of the name itself would reveal information about the person.136 
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POPI only applies to Personal Information that is processed so the definition of processing is 
important.   Processing includes collection, receipt, recording, organisation, collation, storage, 
updating, modification, retrieval, alteration, use, dissemination, merging.137POPI will not apply 
in instances where processing of personal information is for purely personal or household 
activities. This is a broad application compared to what has been known throughout the years due 
to our case law that the right to privacy is mainly recognised in one’s intimate sphere or private 
life. The Bill will also not apply to the state when it is involved in matters pertaining to national 
security, defence or public safety. POPI Act does not apply to journalistic purposes as long as it 
is subject to a code of ethics and has sufficient safeguards in place.  
 
The POPI Act in brief─ 
(i) is a general information protection statute; 
(ii) is applicable to both the public and private sector; 
(iii) covers both automatic and manual processing; and 
(iv) will protect identifiable natural and juristic persons.138 
Chapter 3 of the Act deals with the conditions for the lawful processing of personal information 
and consists of Part A (processing of personal information in general), Part B (processing of 
special personal information) and Part C (processing of personal information of 
children).139Another welcome development is the formal introduction of information security to 
South African law with the introduction of Chapter 3: condition 7.  This is the first time that 
information security has directly been addressed in any South African legislation. Condition 7 
introduces requirement around security measures having to be introduced to secure the integrity 
of personal information as well as the requirement to notify third parties of a breach of 
security.  This is the first of many evolving and current information security trends in our law. 
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The POPI Act is aimed at giving effect to South African citizens’ constitutional right to privacy. 
This is going to be achieved through: 
• Providing for the rights of data subjects with regard to their ability to protect their personal 
information as it is processed by public or private bodies, as well as giving data subjects 
remedies they can use should those rights be infringed.140 
• Providing a framework that sets out the minimum conditions that must be met when personal 
information is processed by organisations, whether they are public or private.141 
• Establishing an Information Protection Regulator, whose primary purposes will be to promote 
awareness of the rights of data subjects when it comes to protecting their personal information, 
as well as enforcing the requirements of the Bill.142 
 
The POPI Act pursues a balanced approach to the protection of personal information, mandating 
due regard for the justifiable limitations of the right to privacy, the need to secure the interests of 
free flow of information and managing the tensions between the rights of access to information 
and protection of personal information.143 
 
The provisions of the Protection Of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013 that are relevant to this 
paper: 
 
The “pre-emption” provisions of the Act in section 3, state that any other legislation that is 
stricter than the Act must still apply, meaning that a Privacy Officer cannot rely solely on the Act 
for the development of their privacy program they must look to other stricter monitoring 
legislation to assert their privacy.144 Consideration will have to be given to  legislation such as 
the Consumer Protection Act, the Promotion of Access to Information Act, the Companies Act, 
to name just a few of the other pieces of legislation that make up the South African regulatory 
universe. 
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Section 10 requires responsible parties to obtain consent from a data subject prior to processing 
his information.145 This can be achieved through privacy notices on websites and contracts. 
 
Section 13 requires organisations to delete personal information that is no longer required, unless 
it needs to be retained by law, for the purposes of a contract between the organisation and the 
data subject or if the data subject has given his/ her consent to the information being retained.146 
This requirement has been conceived to be problematic in the future, given the multitude of 
legislation that requires records to be kept for differing periods of time.147 Section 13(2) also 
states that personal information may be retained for “historical, statistical or research 
purposes”.148 It has been submitted that this wording may be open to interpretation, and that 
organisations may retain personal information for ‘research’, which may be their own marketing 
research.149 
 
Section 17 of POPI requires organisations to explain to a data subject what his/ her information 
is being used for.150 It has been argued that, given the many purposes for which organisations use 
personal information once it has been collected, how will this be meaningfully communicated to 
the data subject at the time of collection?151 
 
Section 22 of POPI implies that data subjects will be able to ask organisations whether the 
organisation stores or processes any of their personal information, and can submit a request to 
have that information deleted.152Section 22 further allows a data subject to request access to his/ 
her information held by a responsible party.153 
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Just like its counter parts for example RICA and the ECT Act which require consent for the 
interception of information, POPI under  s71(1) prohibits using electronic communications for 
direct marketing unless the data subject has given his/ her consent or is a customer of the 
responsible party.154 Section 71(2) permits an organisation to approach a data subject once in 
order to obtain their consent.155 
 
Section 34 allows for the Regulator to authorise the processing of personal information even in 
situations where the processing does not comply with the requirements of the POPI Act.156 
Unlike in the RICA and other Acts on information privacy which grants discretion on the judge 
to decide when to allow an exception for interception, POPI awards this authority to the 
Regulator. 
 
In conclusion the enactment of the POPI Act is going to bring a significant level of protection to 
individuals and organisations in South Africa with regard to how their personal information is 
handled. Unlike recent years legislation , individuals will have the ability to hold organisations to 
account for the actions that are taken regarding personal information. From the perspective of an 
individual, this legislation is welcome but from the perspective of the organisations that will 
have to amend systems, processes and policies in order to comply with the legislation, however, 
this Act may have a significant impact on the way that they do business. The Regulator has a 
task ahead of him, especially given the heavy compliance burden that organisations already carry 
to the extent that , it may initially be wise for the Regulator to focus on awareness and training of 
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Chapter 3: Reasons why the employer monitors the internet, email and telephone 
corresponding of the employee 
3. Introduction 
The internet, telephone and email are indispensable tools of business in the workplace so the 
employer cannot do without them but he/she will have to guard against the potential risk of civil 
or criminal liability brought on by the employee through misuse of these tools. In certain 
circumstances the employer has a duty to monitor employee electronic transmissions but it must 
be for a legitimate purpose. There are various reasons why an employer may wish to monitor the 
internet and some of these reasons are discussed below. 
3.1 Vicarious liability  
Our law recognises the doctrine of vicarious liability in terms of which one person can be held 
liable to a third party for the edictal acts performed by another which caused loss to that third 
party.157Vicarious liability is a doctrine of liability without fault in terms of which one person is 
held liable for the unlawful acts of another.158 It is a strict liability, or liability without fault, on 
the part of the defendant and is additional to that of the other person‘s delict. Vicarious liability 
is based on social policy regarding what is fair and reasonable and amounts to an expression of a 
society‘s legal convictions that victims of a delictual conduct should be able to recover damages 
from someone who has the ability to pay.159For vicarious liability to be incurred there must be a 
special relationship between the two persons and one such important relationship is the 
employer-employee relationship. Under this doctrine an employer may be held liable to a third 
party for the delictual acts performed by employees.160The rational for this doctrine is for the 
third party to enjoy fair and full compensation for his loss by suing the person who is able to 
compensate him properly and who should have taken adequate measures of competence not to 
employ the employee who has caused loss to the third party.161Although vicarious liability has its 
origin in the law of delict it has developed as a general labour law principle that the employer 
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will be liable for the delicts committed by its employees. Basson162 states the following as issues 
that should be considered in order to constitute employer's liability; 
a) there must be a contract of service between the employee and the employer at the 
time the employee carries out an unlawful act, 
b) the conduct of the employee must have been unlawful to the extent that the requirements for a 
delict must be meet and, 
c) the employee must have acted in the course and scope of the employee’s duties orservice.  163 
For these requirements to be satisfied, especially the third requirement, these acts must be 
committed by the employee in the exercise of the functions to which he/she was appointed, 
including such acts as are reasonably necessary to carry out the employer‘s instructions. This is 
further explained by, 
The standard test for vicarious liability of a master for the delict of a servant is whether the delict was 
committed by the employee while acting in the course and scope of his employment. The enquiry is 
frequently said to be whether at the relevant time the employee was about the affairs, or business, or doing 
the work of the employer…164 
According to Mischke165it is a principle of our common law that an employer may be held jointly 
and severely liable with an employee for an employee's wrongful acts committed in the course 
and within the scope of the employees' duties. The issue is clearly illustrated by Rycroft166when 
he states that, the employer may not be able to escape liability merely because the act was 
intentional on the part of the employee, amounted to criminal conduct or was specifically 
prohibited by the employer. Paterson, states that activities that may create legal liability include 
the downloading or distribution of copyright material, the posting of defamatory material on 
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bulletin boards and the circulation of defamatory material on bulletin boards.167 To substantiate 
his position he refers to a case in which a Chevron Corporation paid out $2.l2 million to settle a 
sexual harassment case brought by female employees as a result of an email titled 'why beer is 
better than women'.168An employer stands to be held liable for wrongful activities committed by 
an employee’s internet and network related acts regardless of the fact that an employer had 
specifically prohibited those acts. The question that begs to be answered is whether an employee 
acted within the scope of his or her duties.                                                                                     
The question whether the act falls within or outside the scope of employment is not without 
problems and the answer has been described as a question of law, but it has also been said that 
each case will depend on its own facts. In determining whether an employee‘s actions fall within 
the scope of his or her employment and therefore renders the employer vicariously liable, both a 
subjective test and an objective test may be applied.169The consequence of these tests is that an 
employer will be able to escape liability only if the employer can prove that the employee‘s 
intention was to solely promote his or her own interests (the subjective test) and that the 
employee had completely disengaged himself or herself from the affairs of the employer when 
committing the delict (the objective test).In Viljoen v Smith170the employee, although prohibited 
by his employer, climbed through a fence and walked some 70 meters onto the third party‘s farm 
to relieve himself. While doing so, he lit a cigarette and caused a fire. The Court held that the 
employee had not abandoned his place of work and that he was still acting within the course and 
scope of his employment.171 This indicates that the mere existence of a digression does not 
automatically result in the employer not being found vicariously liable for the delict of an 
employee.172Although the employee had disobeyed the employer’s instruction, the employer was 
held to be vicariously liable because employee was still engaged in the business of the employer. 
The employer’s liability depends on the nature of the digression and the surrounding 
circumstances.  
3.2 Defamation: 
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Defamation is the unlawful, intentional, publication of defamatory words or conduct referring to 
the plaintiff which causes his reputation to be impaired.173In order to determine whether the 
contents of an e-mail are defamatory, it must first be ascertained whether a reasonable person of 
ordinary intelligence may reasonably understand the e-mail to contain a defamatory meaning as 
regards the plaintiff.174For an employer to be liable for defamatory e-mail sent by an employee in 
the course of his or her employment, the requirement of publication must be met. As to what 
constitutes publication on the Internet was illustrated in National Media v Bogoshi175 which 
stated that publication is the act of making known a defamatory statement or the act of conveying 
an imputation by conduct, to a person or persons other than the person who is the subject of the 
defamatory statement or conduct.176 It has been submitted that, it can be inferred from this 
statement that the following acts will amount to publication: postings to a newsgroup, sending an 
email, making a website available on the internet, internet relay chat and file transfer by file 
transfer protocol.177InCWU v Mobile Telephone Networks (Pty) Ltd178 it was evident that liability 
for defamation can result in vicarious liability for a company. This case concerned a derogatory 
e-mail sent by one of the employees of MTN. The e-mail contained allegations that MTN‘s 
management was corrupt and that they show favouritism to a certain temporary employment 
agency. MTN charged the employee with: (i) intentional circulation of an email insinuating that 
MTN management was corrupt; (ii) intentionally and disrespectfully engaging in abusive and 
insulting language in that he insinuated that management were fat cats; (iii) making unfounded 
allegations against management by insinuating in the email that management was benefiting 
from recruitment processes; (iv) bringing the company‘s image into disrepute in that he 
circulated the email to MTN employees; and (v) intentionally conducting himself in an 
insubordinate manner in that the email contained derogatory remarks against MTN management 
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and clients.179  The court found that the employee had failed to comply with the procedure 
established by MTN for reporting allegations of fraud, and that he was seeking a wider audience 
in the form of MTN management and employees.180 His email therefore increased the damage to 
the reputation of MTN and his actions therefore justified a defamation suit against him. The 
court held that in addition, there were grounds on which the clients of MTN could institute a 
vicarious liability suit against MTN.181A court can find that in providing an employee with tools 
to access the internet and email facilities, the employer is directly liable as a publisher or 
disseminator of the offending statement. Employers that decide not to regulate publication of 
material on the internet by their employees could be potentially exposing themselves to a 
possible claim for negligence on grounds that they owed a duty of care to their employees and 
third parties to impose some restrictions. From the above therefore it is accurate to conclude that 
if a defamatory statement is posted on a Usenet newsgroup or where the email is sent to a person 
other than the person who is defamed in the message, the requirements of publication would 
have been met.182 Where an e-mail/s is used as the medium for defamatory remarks in the 
workplace it is important to remember that the defamation will probably occur at the place where 
the offending material is accessed. 
3.3 Sexual Harassment and Discrimination  
It is a well known fact that sexual harassment can occur through electronic means therefore 
creating a need for the employer to monitor employees’ electronic transactions.  Sexual 
harassment may take the form of coarse jokes sent via e-mail, pornographic screen-savers and 
crude graphics. Racial and religious discrimination cases can also be based on offensive 
electronic content, regardless of the sender‘s intentions.183   Parliament and our courts have 
sought to protect employees who are victims of sexual harassment by imposing certain 
obligations that may render the employers liable as to curb the rising of sexual harassment claims 
in the workplace. 184 Employers are under a legal duty to prevent discriminatory acts being 
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perpetrated against their employees. This was illustrated in the case of Media 24185, where 
Farlem JA held that an employer has a legal duty that is dictated by public policy to prevent 
harm such as sexual harassment to its employees. In terms of section 5 of The Employment 
Equity Act 55 of 1998 (EEA) an employer is under an obligation to combat unfair discrimination 
in the workplace which is stated by, “Every employer must take steps to promote equal 
opportunity in the workplace by eliminating unfair discrimination in any employment policy or 
practice.”186 
Harassment can generally be defined as any humiliating or degrading treatment of a person 
because of their personal characteristics.187 Harassment is a form of unfair discrimination and is 
prohibited in the workplace. 188 Harassment in any form is treated in the EEA as a form of unfair 
discrimination. The most common form of harassment in the workplace is sexual harassment.189 
An employer who fails to prevent or put an end to a sexual harassment complaint may be held 
liable.190 The Code of Good Practice on the Handling of Sexual Harassment Cases states that 
sexual attention will become harassment if it is, 
(a) persistent, although a single incident of harassment can constitute sexual harassment; and/or, 
(b) the recipient has made it clear that the behaviour is considered offensive; and/or, 
(c) the perpetrator should have known that the behaviour is regarded as unacceptable.191 
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The Code defines sexual harassment as including various types of conduct, such as, physical, 
verbal, and non-verbal conduct. 
In the case of Ntsabo v Real Security CC192; Ms Ntsabo was employed as a guard with Real 
Security CC. Ms Ntsabo, a single mother, found herself stationed at Khayelitsha Day Hospital. 
She reported to a supervisor who turned out to be worse than a mere groper.193 On one occasion 
the supervisor all but raped her, and then threatened to shoot her if she told anybody about the 
incident. After resigning, she approached the Labour Court for relief, claiming compensation for 
an automatically unfair dismissal and damages for future medical costs and humiliation, 
impairment of dignity, pain, suffering, emotional trauma and the loss of the normal amenities of 
life.194 All this relief was sought against her former employer.195 The court had to consider 
whether the employer Real Security was liable for making the continued employment of Ms 
Ntsabo intolerable, even though the cause of the intolerable situation was due to the conduct of 
an employee of Real Security (the supervisor), who, while he may have harassed the employee 
during working hours, could hardly be said to have been acting in the course and scope of his 
duties.196 The court held that an employer can only be held liable for the conduct of one of the 
employees if the employer created an intolerable situation by failing to prevent one of its 
employees from creating and perpetuating an intolerable situation for another and further that an 
employer can only be held to have failed to prevent an employee from creating and maintaining 
an intolerable situation for another if it (or its management) was aware of the situation and did 
nothing about it.197 Pillay AJ held that Ms Ntsabo had done all that could reasonably be expected 
of her to attempt to hold onto her employment and avoid being sexually harassed. 198  The 
employer had brushed aside her complaint. This inaction was held to be unfair and had created 
an intolerable working environment for Ms Ntsabo.199 Her resignation accordingly constituted a 
constructive dismissal.200 The EEA now gives the Labour Court power to grant compensation 
and/or damages to employees who are victims of discrimination on various grounds cited in the 
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Act. 201  On the sexual harassment issue, the court found that the senior employee of the 
corporation had contravened section 6(3) of the EEA and that the corporation was liable for the 
conduct of such employee in contravening the Act.202 The Labour Court exercised its power in 
terms of section 50 to award compensation and damages in respect of unfair discrimination, it 
awarded Ntsabo R20 000 for future medical costs, and R50 000 as general damages.203 
3.4. Gender and Racial Issues 
If an employee engages in sending material which has gender or racial sensitive contents it may 
have serious implications for both the company and the employee who sent the mail. A sexual 
harassment claim and a racial discrimination claim can be directed to both the employee and 
employer. In Cronje v Toyota Manufacturing 204an employee was dismissed as a result of a racist 
cartoon distributed at the workplace. The applicant received an e-mail which he printed out to 
other colleagues at a meeting.205 The e-mail consisted of a cartoon depicting an adult and a 
young gorilla, both with the head of President Mugabe of Zimbabwe superimposed on them.206 
The caption stated 'we want to grow more bananas'.207 He defended himself by stating that he did 
not regard the cartoon as racist but rather as a depiction of Zimbabwe as a banana republic.208 
The human resources manager deposed that the respondent's internet and e-mail usage code 
specifically outlawed the display and or transmission of any offensive racial, sexual, religious or 
political images documents on any company system.209 The factory employed 3500 blacks and 
1000 whites so race related issues were very important on the factory floor and black employees 
were upset by the cartoon.210 The Commissioner found that it was reasonable to include a rule 
prohibiting the distribution of racist and inflammatory or offensive material in the company's 
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code and that the applicant was aware of the rule which was consistently applied. 211  The 
Commissioner found the dismissal to be fair.212 
3.5. Viewing of Pornography  
Pornography is easily accessible on the Internet. Certain forms of on-line pornography (also 
referred to as cyber porn) constitute cyber crime and may be prosecuted in terms of the Films 
and Publications Act 65 of 1996 (hereafter referred to as the Act).213 The Act is the principal 
statute governing online pornography in South Africa.214 Section 2 of the Act outlines the objects 
of the Act as follows: 
 
(a) to regulate the creation, production, possession and distribution of certain publications and 
certain films by means of classification, the imposition of age restrictions and the giving of 
consumer advice, due regard being had in particular to the protection of children against sexual 
exploitation or degradation in publications, films and on the Internet; and  
(b) to make the exploitative use of children in pornographic publications, films or on the Internet 
punishable. 215 
Section 1 of the Act defines publication as inter alia (i) computer software which is not a film; 
and (ii) any message or communication, including a visual presentation, placed on any 
distributed network including but not confined to the Internet.216 Most forms of pornography on 
the Internet can be classified as publications, with the exception of a pornographic video clip, 
which could rather be classified as a film due to the fact that the definition of film includes 
―images (that) can be capable of being seen as a moving picture.217 Section 27 of the Act 
specifically deals with child pornography and the offences under it have been categorised into 
three types :(a) Offences dealing with the actual perpetrator; (b) failure to report knowledge of 
the commission of an offence referred to in paragraph (a); and (c) failure to prevent access to 
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certain materials. 218 In most cases the employer will be held liable under offences b and c. 
Section 27 (1) makes it an offence for any person to be in possession of, create, distribute, import 
or knowingly export or takes steps to export a film or publication which contains child 
pornography or which advocates, advertises or promotes child pornography or the sexual 
exploitation of children.219 In terms of s 30 (1A) contraventions of s 27 (1) are punishable with a 
fine or imprisonment for a period not exceeding 10 years. 220 Section 27 (2) (b) places a duty 
upon any person who has knowledge of an offence under section 27 (1) or has reason to suspect 
that such an offence has been or is being committed to report that offence or suspicion of that 
offence to the South African Police Service. Internet Service Providers (ISP‘s) have a vital role 
to play with regards to the accessibility of the Internet because failure to do so the wrong will be 
imputed on them. Ignorance is not a defence to the ISP whose services are used for the hosting or 
distribution of child pornography. Section 27 A is specifically aimed at regulating the duties and 
responsibilities of ISPs in relation to child pornography and was placed in the statute book by the 
second Films and Publications Amendment Act 18 of 2004. Every ISP is required to take all 
reasonable steps to prevent the use of its services for the hosting or distribution of child 
pornography.221 Section 30B (l) (b) provides that if in any prosecution in terms of the Act access 
was gained or attempted to be gained to child pornography on a distributed network, including 
the Internet, by means of access provided or granted to a registered subscriber or user, it shall be 
presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary which raises reasonable doubt, that such 
access was gained or attempted to be gained by the registered subscriber or user.222Section 30B 
maintains that employers must ensure that their employees are not engaged in the creation, 
production, distribution and possession of pornographic material because the unlawful conduct 
can be imputed on the company itself although in actual fact it’s not the actual wrongdoer but 
due to the fact that it owns the tools it is responsible for the material on company computers and 
e- mail systems. It is submitted that the implications of s 30 B (1) and S 30 B (1) (b) are crucial 
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to the business and reputation of the company because the company brand is ultimately 
tarnished.223 
3.6. Intellectual Property  
Electronic content is subject to copyright. In terms of South African copyright law, copyright is 
the right given to the owner of certain types of works not to have his/her work copied without 
authorisation.224 Work is copyrighted when it has been created by the author‘s original skill and 
effort and has been reduced to material form and is therefore not merely an idea.225Copyright is 
protected in South Africa in terms of the Copyright Act 98 of 1978 (hereafter referred to as the 
Act). Copyright gives the owner the right to prevent the unauthorised reproduction of his/her 
work as well as protection against the commercial exploitation.226 In terms of the Act, two forms 
of copyright infringement can take place, namely direct and indirect infringement.227 In South 
Africa, one does not have to register copyright (as is the case with other forms of intellectual 
property, such as patents or trademarks). A copyright situation will arise automatically as soon as 
something tangible is produced as a result of the author‘s original skill and effort.228 Once an 
expression is entered into a computer in a form that can be read on a screen, it is considered fixed 
in a material medium even if it is never printed out or saved to a disk.229 Therefore employees 
surfing web sites are not entitled to freely copy and distribute content obtained from those web 
sites owned by companies without obtaining prior permission.230 This extends to copying images 
and text found on the web site. The World Wide Web now makes it possible to download 
magazine articles, reports, song titles, videos and photographs, all of which are protected by 
copyright. A computer software program placed on the Internet can also be downloaded at sites 
around the world and re-posted.231 This has obviously created numerous problems for publishers 
and a potential nightmare for the creators of articles, songs, software and films, as the owners 
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will want to protect their materials. While there are steps and measures being put in place by 
operators and creators to protect the content of their web sites against indiscriminate copying, 
there is a large amount of online content that is not technically protected against copying.232 This 
being the case, there is a serious potential for loss that could arise for corporate employers where 
such copying is conducted by their employees.233 If an employee ignores these stipulations, 
he/she will expose the company to vicarious liability for copyright infringement.  
3.7. Performance Monitoring 
It is alleged that surveillance of usage of the e-mail and internet usage serves the purpose of 
monitoring performance as well as enhancing productivity. 234  It is further stated that such 
commonly used software programme will not only monitor the usage of the internet and e-mail 
but also has the ability to record every stroke programme used and file opened or copied so as to 
incorporate such information into a searchable report.235 
3.8. Personal use 
Working people spend a great deal of their working time at the workplace. They therefore expect 
some kind of privacy at the workplace even though they are utilising the company's property. 
The big challenge is where the employer can draw the line between permitting personal use (that 
is non-company related use) of e-mail facilities and other communication facilities by its 
employees which might be harmful to the company’s business interests. Buys236 maintains that 
there are those who hold the view that if all personal use is totally prohibited then no employee 
would have any possible expectation in any stored material (for example computer or e-mail) . 
He further articulates that the better practice is to permit restricted personal use of e-mail either 
internally or externally and then incorporate other policies such as privacy expectation and 
misuse of company resources around this pragmatic acknowledgement.237 Personal use should 
entail some articulated constraints on such use and should not be allowed to consume a 
significant amount of the employee’s workday. Employers do have a vested interest in promoting 
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good communication and strong relationships between employees. Thus, employers are willing 
to compromise and are of the view that as long as the number or length of personal calls is not 
excessive. An employee may make calls that have nothing to do with employer’s business affairs 
and that employee is justified to have a legitimate expectation to privacy. 238  Although an 
employee must account to employer for time spent, employer cannot compel employee to 
disclose information of such correspondence.239Electronic facilities at work are primarily for the 
employer’s business and are to be used in the course and scope of the employee’s 
functions.240There is a contrast argument that states that, the opportunity for some personal use 
of the internet may in fact enhance an employee’s skills in the effective use of the electronic 
medium and reduce the amount of time required for personal, face to face transaction so it is to 
the employer’s advantage to promote employee personal use of company property.241 It has been 
further alleged that a more logical approach is to monitor employees' productive output rather 
than their electronic transaction and to confine surveillance to situations where there is reason to 
believe that this may be implicated in a low or reduced level of productivity.242 
In conclusion, the internet and telephone is the property of the employer and hence should be 
used as such. To create a balance and avoid abuse of employer’s property, the employer must put 
in place policy clearly setting out the rights and obligations of the employer as well as the 
employee so as to eliminate many misconceptions. If the employee is aware of the contents of 
the policy disciplinary action for non compliance is justified. There is no question that in an 
employment relationship the computer or telephone would be the property of the employer. The 
employer may therefore wish to monitor the internet and telephone use such as the size of the 
message, attachments, the frequency and volume of e-mail sent by an employee, number of calls, 
web-sites often visited by the employee, and the frequency of hits of those.The law places no 
significant restrictions on the employer's right to monitor electronic transmissions for legitimate 
purposes but the methods used must not be unduly intrusive and/or reduce employee 
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productivity, and must comply with relevant legislation.243  Each time an employee uses the 
internet for a private purpose he or she should know that he or she is taking up the employer's 
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Chapter 4: Case law on the monitoring of employees in the workplace 
4. Introduction 
Ample cases have surfaced in the law reports to indicate that abuse of electronic communications 
facilities is a problem for employers. Most of these cases involve illicit use of the internet, 
telephone taping and use of company email systems. Through this case law we learn how the 
courts have approached the issue of privacy in the workplace and whether they has been a 
change over the years on how courts have tackled the conflict between the employers right to 
monitor and the employees right to privacy. 
4.1 Cases heard under the Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act 127 of 1992 
In Protea Technology Ltd & Another v Wainer & Others 244  (decided under the Final 
Constitution), the employer had recorded phone calls made by the employee in the workplace 
without his consent. These calls were used in court to prove that the employee was acting in 
breach of a restraint of trade agreement.245 The employee argued that the recording invaded his 
right to privacy and contravened IMPA and that the court had no discretion to admit the 
evidence.246 The Court considered two issues: first, whether the employer’s conduct amounted to 
a breach of privacy and, secondly, whether the common law power of a court to admit evidence 
irrespective of the means by which it is obtained, that is the relevance test in Goosen v 
Caroline’s Frozen Yoghurt Parlour247 remained valid under the new Constitutional dispensation.  
Goosen 248  was decided under the Interim Constitution and concerned the dismissal of an 
employee who after a disciplinary hearing sought to rely on telephone transcripts that he 
obtained without the consent of the employer to show that the chairperson of the disciplinary 
hearing was biased. At issue was the admissibility of the recordings. The Industrial Court found 
the recordings admissible and reasoned in this regard that the test to be applied when 
determining the admissibility of the evidence is whether the evidence is relevant to the matters in 
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issue (the relevance test).249 The Industrial Court in considering the privacy provision in section 
13 of the Constitution and the limitations clause in respect to the first issue, the Court held that 
the right to privacy requires a subjective expectation of privacy which society recognizes as 
objectively reasonable.250 The court held that the 1992 Information Act did not expressly or by 
necessary inference render the production of recordings made in contravention of its terms 
inadmissible in a civil action.251Protea Technology was followed in Tap Wine Trading CC v 
Cape Classic Wines252, and was even extended to the criminal context in S v Dube253 where court 
held that, a recording of a conversation between car thieves was held to be not “confidential” and 
hence excluded from protection under the 1992 Act. 
In Protea Technology, the court observed: 
The scope of a person’s privacy extends only to those aspects in regard to which a legitimate 
expectation of privacy can be harboured. Whether it exists requires a subjective expectation of 
privacy which society recognises as objectively reasonable.254 
 
More significantly, the Court also held that the employee’s subjective expectation of privacy    
not to be objectively reasonable in light of the fact that the employee was in a position of trust 
and the telephone calls were made from the employer’s premises within business hours.255 The 
Court concluded that, because the parties were in an employment relationship, the conversations 
relating to the employer’s affairs were not private and therefore not protected by the 
Constitution.256 With respect to the second issue, the Court found that the discretion to admit 
illegally obtained evidence had to be exercised with reference to the substance of section 36(1) 
of the Constitution, meaning that, the competing interests had to be balanced. The Court 
accordingly concluded the relevance test in Goosen257 was inconsistent with the Constitution, but 
still recognised discretion to be exercised on a case-by-case basis to admit illegally obtained 
evidence.   
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At issue in Moonsamy v The Mailhouse 258  was whether the employer was entitled to use 
evidence at a disciplinary hearing which it had obtained by intercepting and recording the 
employee’s telephone calls in his office and which subsequently contributed to the employee’s 
dismissal. The employee argued that the evidence contravened IMPA and the Constitution. As 
mentioned above, the arbitrator established that IMPA applied only to interception or monitoring 
carried out by the police and the Defence Force.259 The tribunal based this on the fact that section 
3(2) of IMPA provides that any application to a judge for a directive shall be made by a police 
officer, or an army officer, or a member of the intelligence services.260 The arbitrator concluded 
that the recording was in violation of section 14(d) of the Constitution and proceeded to consider 
whether the infringement was justified in terms of the limitations clause contained in the 
Constitution.261 
In considering whether the infringement was justified, the tribunal considered the following 
issues: the nature of right ; the importance of the purpose of the limitation; the extent and nature 
of the limitation; the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and whether less restrictive 
means to achieve the purpose were available.262 In respect of the nature of the right, the tribunal 
held that the employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of calls made at his 
employer’s premises.263 With reference to the importance of the purpose of the limitation, the 
tribunal reasoned that the employer considered its actions necessary for financial preservation 
and therefore the employee’s right to privacy had to be qualified.264 The arbitrator observed that 
the court in Protea Technology265 identified the competing interests to be the employee’s right to 
privacy versus the employer’s right to economic activity. The right to economic activity is no 
longer guaranteed in terms of the Final Constitution and has been replaced by section 22 of 
Constitution guaranteeing freedom of trade, occupation and profession.266 The introduction of 
section 22, according to the tribunal, seemed to indicate that the framers of the Constitution 
preferred “the employee’s personal right to the more amorphous (consequently controversial) 
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right to economic activity”.267 In considering the nature and extent of the limitation, the arbitrator 
opined that an employer might have a right to ask an employee to disclose the number of 
personal calls he or she made during working hours.268 With regard to the relationship between 
the limitation and its purpose, the tribunal reasoned that if an employer showed that telephone 
tapping was the only method through which it could secure essential evidence against an 
employee, its use may be justified.269 As regards less restrictive measures to achieve the purpose, 
the tribunal reasoned that if the only method to obtain evidence was telephone tapping, the 
employer should have sought prior authorization.270  Leaving aside the question whether the 
constitutional limitations are indeed applicable to the assessment of specific acts of employees, 
the test adopted in Moonsamy271was as good as any that might be chosen. However, it still begs 
the wider question: what are the limits of the employee’s right to privacy?272 
In Moonsamy273, the commissioner conceded that this question cannot be answered in vacuo. 
Following the American case of Katz v US 389 US 347 (1967), he observed: 
Office practices and procedures, and legitimate employer regulations, might reduce the employee’s 
expectations of privacy in their offices, desks and filing cabinets. Given the great variety of work 
environments, the question of whether an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy must be 
addressed on a case-by-case basis. 
The commissioner held that by continually tapping Moonsamy’s telephone with the express 
purpose of monitoring all his conversations, the employer had gone further than “rummaging in 
[his] desk or filing cabinet”.274 Importantly, the commissioner found that the assessment of the 
reasonableness of the infringement did not depend on the nature of the evidence uncovered by 
the tap; the method chosen must be assessed in advance. Telephone conversations, said the 
commissioner, are a “very private affair”. Therefore: 
An employer might have the right to ask an employee to disclose the number of personal as 
opposed to business calls he or she makes during working hours, but the right to disclosure 
ends there, unless the employer can show, when seeking prior authorisation [which the 
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commissioner suggested might be obtained from the Labour Court], that there are compelling 
reasons within the context of business necessity, that the contents of those conversations are 
disclosed.275 
In Moonsamy, 276 the commissioner therefore recognised that employees cannot in all 
circumstances invoke their right to privacy to prevent employers from using the contents of their 
personal communications against them in disciplinary proceedings. Everything depends on the 
reasonable operational needs of the employer.  
In Sugreen v Standard Bank of SA277the commissioner came to an opposite conclusion. In this 
case, the employer had obtained a tape recording of a conversation between one of its managers 
and a service provider which revealed evidence of a bribe. The tape recording was made and 
given to the employer by the alleged briber.278 The commissioner distinguished Moonsamy279on 
the basis that there were few other methods by which evidence against the employee could be 
acquired, that the recording had not been part of a continual monitoring and was not made by the 
employer itself, that this was a case of ‘participant monitoring’, that the recording was made 
during business hours, using the employer’s telephone. Given all these factors, it was fair to 
admit the recording as evidence.280It is ample to recognise that the use by the employee of the 
employer’s telephone and e-mail are legitimate areas of interest to the employer where it 
suspects that the employee is guilty of misconduct.281 
 
Prior to IMPA coming into effect, “all relevant evidence which was not rendered inadmissible by 
an exclusionary rule was admissible in a civil court irrespective of how it was obtained”.282 This 
unrestricted use of evidence resulted in abuse and violations of privacy. IMPA restricted the 
manner in which evidence was obtained and further introduced penalties for obtaining evidence 
in a manner contrary to the Act's requirements. The language of IMPA further points to the fact 
that the legislation was intended to apply to state agencies which were in the business of 
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intelligence gathering for purposes of investigating and ultimately combating criminal activities. 
Before the tribunal's reasoning in Moonsamy v The Mailhouse,283 it appears as if courts were 
quite willing to find that the application of IMPA was wide and that the Act applied to 
interception and monitoring in the private sphere. One reason for this is that certain terms in 
IMPA and its general prohibition were couched widely enough for the argument to be made that 
the Act could well regulate the interception and monitoring in places such as the workplace.   
4.2 Cases herd under The Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of 
Communication – Related Information Act (RICPCIA) 
Bamford & Others/Energizer (SA) Limited, 284  is one of the earliest decisions to put into 
perspective or effectively address the issue of employee privacy in the workplace, particularly in 
relation to the use of the employer's e-mail and Internet facilities. In this case Energizer, a 
leading manufacturer of batteries for electrical appliances, summarily dismissed a group of its 
female employees for violating the company’s e- mail policy.285 The company dismissed the 
applicants on the following charges: 
 The repeated violation of company policies and procedure regarding the use of 
company e-mail.  
 The repeated receipt and forwarding to colleagues of obscene pornographic, racist 
and sexist material and jokes.                                     
The applicants did not deny receiving and forwarding the said material and jokes. However, they 
contended that there was no clear rule against the private use of e-mail, that their right to privacy 
was invaded, and that there was a discriminatory application of discipline by the respondent.286 
In respect of last-mentioned claim, the applicants argued  that the standard of behaviour required 
by the respondent as regards company e-mail use was flawed because, were it applied across the 
board in business and industry, almost every employee would be at risk of losing their jobs.287 
Meaning the receipt and forwarding of pornographic, racist and sexist material and jokes rule 
was not consistently applied. 
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The arbitrator had scarce sympathy with this argument. He said: 
The material which has been the subject-matter of this arbitration has not been ‘personal’ in 
any respect. The proper label may be non-business or even ‘private’ but nevertheless it consists 
entirely of material generated by anonymous third parties and distributed for the consumption 
of interested parties on the internet. In no sense whatsoever has the personal dignity or personal 
affairs of any of the individual applicants in the least been disturbed. Furthermore, all the 
information which was the subject matter of the proceedings was derived from storage facilities 
in the company’s own e-mail system. It can hardly be said; even in respect of genuinely 
‘personal’ communications that individuals are entitled to deposit intimate material in their 
employer’s storage facility and require their employer not to examine it in order to determine 
whether there is any point to it being kept.288 
 
In considering these arguments the arbitrator found that although the standard policy document 
did not explicitly prohibit e-mail use in the workplace, there was enough wording in the 
document to suggest such prohibitions. The background of the applicants, which the arbitrator 
described as ‘middleclass…not bereft of education’, convinced the arbitrator that the applicants 
should have known that their conduct was not socially acceptable.289 The arbitrator further stated 
that some of the materials received and forwarded by the applicants were ‘contrary to what 
would circulate amongst self-respecting people.’290 Lastly, the arbitrator stated that even if the 
policy was silent on prohibitions against e-mail use in the workplace, common sense should have 
directed the applicants that the grotesqueness of the material they were receiving and forwarding 
had no place in the workplace.291 The dismissals were found to be fair because of:  
 The risks posed by the trafficking; 
 The grotesqueness of the images;  
 The danger of the outside world becoming aware of the exchanges of these messages and 
the further risk of the domain name of the respondent being associated with such material 
and jokes; 
 The respondent’s exposure to trademark violations as the applicants resorted to 
entertaining themselves with trademark parodies ; 







 The offence that could be taken to the material and jokes by other staff members and  
 The embarrassment to the employer by the exchange of such material and jokes.292 
The arbitrator found that the material and jokes concerned could not be described as personal in 
nature, the personal dignity or personal affairs of the applicants had not been affected in any 
way, and the material and jokes concerned were stored in the respondent’s computers and could 
not be considered personal communications hence they was no violation of the right to 
privacy.293Bamford294  broke new ground in that it made clear that, even where there is no 
(explicit) policy  regulating employee use of e-mail in a workplace,  employees cannot argue that 
they had a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of  all received and forwarded 
communications in that workplace.   
The applicant in Cronje v Toyota Manufacturing295 had been dismissed for circulating a cartoon 
he received via company e-mail. The cartoon superimposed President Mugabe of Zimbabwe 
head’s on a gorilla’s body. The bigger gorilla depicted in the cartoon was holding a smaller 
gorilla, also with Mugabe’s features, with a caption alongside worded “Mugabe and his right 
hand man. We want the farms to grow more bananas.”296 Although privacy considerations did 
not play a role in this case, the respondent argued that it found it necessary to dismiss the 
applicant based on the following:  
 race and race related issues are familiar and important issues on the shop floor;  
 the employer’s factory employed a total of 4500 employees and 77 percent of these 
employees were black. This means one had to take extra care and display extra sensitivity 
towards the race issue, especially in light  of the country’s past;  
 concern that the incident would cause serious problems such as industrial action on the 
shop floor; 
  the employer had dealt harshly with race related incidents in the past; 
 employees knew that  racially offensive remarks and the distribution of racially offensive 
material or sexually explicit material would be dealt with in a very serious light;  








 the employer’s internet and e-mail  code specifically prohibited the display and/or 
transmission of any offensive racial, sexual, religious or political images, documents and 
images on the company system; 
  the depiction of a black person as an ape is racist and there is still a section of the white 
population that associated black people with apes; and  
 the respondent’s shop stewards and black employees found the cartoon very offensive in 
that it portrayed black people as apes.297 
The employee argued that he did not regard himself or the cartoon as racist, which is why he 
readily distributed the cartoon to others. The applicant also acknowledged that he was aware of 
the company’s e-mail policy, but was not aware of the fact that the cartoon fell within the 
policy’s prohibitions.298 
On analysis of the evidence and argument, the presiding commissioner found that the cartoon 
was racist and inflammatory. He held,   
“The subject of the crude superimposition is President Mugabe, but the picture and to no 
lesser extent, the caption, fall square into the crude, offensive, racist stereotype developed 
over centuries by white people that associate black people with primates, beings of lesser 
intelligence and lower morality…The fact that the offensive, racist stereotype associating 
black people with apes exists is not disputed. This is a matter of deep moral, social and 
cultural sensitivity to black people, and this sort of offensive racial stereotyping is not by 
any means limited to black people ...These caricatures were and are still are, deeply 
offensive.... They offend people’s self-image as a cultural racial entity. The depiction of 
an Islamic leader as a pig would be found to be deeply reprehensible by Muslims in this 
and in many countries. In the same way the depiction of a black person as an ape is racist, 
inflammatory and inherently wrong.”299 
The employee in Singh and Island View Storage Ltd 300  had been dismissed for sending a 
sexually explicit e-mail to 3 of his colleagues on the company's intranet. The employee admitted 
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that he was aware that the e-mail he had sent was inappropriate and contained sexually explicit 
material and also that he was aware of the company's electronic communications policy and that 
his conduct could result in his dismissal.301 The employee argued that he had intended no harm 
in sending out the e-mail but had done so as a joke.302 The employee further argued that the 
company's electronic communications policy had not been consistently applied.303 Although the 
commissioner agreed that this was probably the case, the commissioner also reasoned that what 
was of paramount importance was the employee's motive in sending out the e-mail. In this 
respect, the commissioner found that the employee's motive was to embarrass and cause offence 
as he had admitted that he had a hostile and less than amicable relationship with his colleagues. 
The commissioner concluded that the employee was well aware of the consequences of his 
actions and his intention in sending the e-mail was to offend and insult his colleagues and, as 
such, found his dismissal to be justified.  
The decision of Toker Bros (Pty) Ltd and Keyser304 adopted the reasoning in Bamford.305  In 
Toker Bros (Pty) Ltd and Keyser an employee was charged with dishonesty in that she 
excessively misused the company computer for personal use during working hours and without 
permission.306 The employee was further charged with making defamatory remarks about her 
employer in an e-mail to a friend she sent from the company computer.307 The employee argued 
that her employer was aware that she was accessing the Internet to arrange a 20th school reunion, 
that her access to the Internet was mostly work related and that she was not told by her employer 
about a policy or rule against personal use of the Internet.308 The employee further admitted the 
defamatory remarks about her employer in her e-mail to a friend, but challenged the manner in 
which the e-mail was retrieved by her employer.309 The employer argued that it had advised the 
employee not to download from the Internet and denied giving her permission to use the Internet 
to arrange her school reunion.310 The arbitrator found that at issue was whether, in the absence of 
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a written and clear policy against personal use of Internet, the employee could be reasonably 
expected to know or be aware of the rule.311 The arbitrator further found that “not all rules and 
policies have to be made known to employees as some common sense... [has] to be weighed 
against reasonableness”.312 As such, the employee “could reasonably have been expected to 
know the rules as she was cautioned at the start of her employment and due to her experience as 
an employee.”313 More importantly, the arbitrator pointed out that the charge was not for using 
Internet for personal use, but for using the Internet excessively for personal use.314 This implies 
that employers reasonably expect their employees to make personal use of company Internet 
facilities, but the employee has to ensure that such use is within reasonable limits and not 
excessive.   
With regard to the employee’s challenge to the manner in which her defamatory e- mail was 
accessed, the employer had argued that the manner in which the e-mail was obtained was not 
illegal in that the e-mail was obtained during an investigation into the employee’s excessive 
Internet usage. 315The arbitrator stated that the right to privacy in the Constitution particularly 
section 14 (d) prohibiting the monitoring and interception of employee communications, can be 
limited where consent has been given or a clear policy on monitoring and intercepting of 
communications in the workplace is implemented.316 The arbitrator found that the e-mail was not 
obtained with malicious intent but its discovery was incidental to the investigation into the 
employee’s abuse of the company’s Internet facility.317 The arbitrator also considered the fact 
that the employee’s e-mail to her friend could have resulted in her employer being held 
vicariously liable in civil law, given that the e-mail could be regarded as offensive and 
insensitive by some of its recipients.318 
In Van Wyk v Independent Newspapers Gauteng (Pty) Ltd & Others 319  the Labour Court 
reinforced the principle that personal e-mails sent from a company’s e-mail system are not 
private as they can be read by other recipients, especially where the intended recipients  also use 
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the company e-mail system. The applicant had been employed as chief sub-editor by a 
newspaper when she had a heated argument with her editor and two other employees while on 
night duty.320 The employee sent an e-mail to her superior a day later in which she vented her 
feelings and frustrations about work  and further referred to her editor and his deputy as that 
‘arse hole’ and ‘his overbearing cohort’.321 This second e-mail landed on her editor’s desk in an 
unmarked envelope, even though the employee and her superior had not forwarded the e-mail to 
anyone else. 322  The employee argued that the second e-mail to her superior should not be 
admitted by the arbitrator because of its private nature.323 The arbitrator found the employee 
should have been reasonably aware that the second e- mail would be read by people other than 
its intended recipient given that: a) when her superior received her e-mail, two of her colleagues 
were standing behind her superior; b) the first and second e-mail were sent within a short time of 
each other and both dealt  wholly or partly with work related issues;  c) the second e-mail was 
not marked private or confidential; d) the company’s e-mail policy stipulated that all information 
stored on the company system belongs to the company and cautions employees not to assume 
that their e-mails will not be read by others; and e) the e-mail had been sent to a communal 
computer which belonged to the company. 324 
Case law relating to staff abuse of company e-mail and Internet suggests that courts and 
commissioners are unlikely to accept the  argument that the employee was unaware of a policy 
regulating such abuse, particularly where the concerned employee held a managerial or 
leadership role in a company and, of course, where the abuse is of an excessive nature.  
The employer in Kalam and Bevcap (Nampak)325 established that over a period of 5 months the 
employee had visited thousands of Internet sites, most of which contained pornographic material. 
The employer found that the employee had spent approximately 285 hours per week visiting 
14802 non - work related sites.326 The employer further ascertained that the employee had visited 
and downloaded sexually explicit images using the company's Internet access.327 The employee 











was dismissed for this reason. The employee contended that his actions could not be considered 
unacceptable because he was aware of the company’s IT policy document, but had not read it 
because it was bulky document. 328  The commissioner found the latter argument to be 
unacceptable and also found that the employee knew of the policy and its content because he 
ignored the popup messages that warned that the sites he was accessing were prohibited.329 The 
commissioner added that even if the employee was unaware of the policy and its contents, his 
common sense should have prevailed.330 The commissioner found the employee's dismissal to 
have been both substantively and procedurally fair.  
The employee in Latchmiah and Billiton Aliminium SA (Pty) Ltd t/a Bayside Aliminium331 the 
employee was also dismissed for repeatedly accessing pornographic websites via the employer’s 
Internet. Unlike the employee in Kalam, the employee in this case argued that he had a 
“dependency problem”, which employer had failed to explore. The employee, who had been 
employed as a process superintendent, further argued that his accessing of pornographic websites 
did not interfere with his work and that the rules in place restricting the accessing of 
pornographic sites, was not consistently applied. 332  The employee further disputed the 
employer's argument that his repeated access interfered with the company's information systems 
as he did not access the sites with malicious intent. 333 
The arbitrator found that, the existence of a well-established rule in the employer's workplace; 
the employee admission to being aware of the rule; the rule was lawful and reasonable because it 
was aimed at dissuading unethical conduct, keeping the company information systems free from 
viruses and outside intrusion, preventing the slowing down of the system due to traffic, as well as 
preventing  sexual harassment claims; the rule had been breached by the employee's conduct and 
the “dependency problem” defence could not be considered because the employee failed to take 
steps to bring the problem to the attention of the employer.334It was further held that, the rule was 
consistently applied; the company's Internet and access policies had evolved because of the 










increase in Internet access in the workplace; and dismissal was an appropriate sanction because 
of the excessive nature of the employee's conduct.335 
From the foregoing discussion of case law decided since the enactment of RICPCIA, it appears 
as if South African courts have taken the following observation towards employee privacy in the 
workplace.  The employer is justified in protecting its business interests by regulating the use of 
e-mail and Internet in the workplace, because it owns the e-mail and Internet facilities in the 
workplace.  Secondly, the absence of an explicit policy or no policy is no excuse for forwarding 
racist or offensive e-mails using the employer's Internet facilities.  Case law decided under IMPA 
addressed the issue of privacy in the context of the interception of communications and it was 
decided that telephone calls in the workplace were not protected by the Act by virtue of the 
nature of the relationship between the employee and employer (Protea Technology336).  
Case law decided after the enactment of RICPCIA  has not really dealt with the application of 
that Act, nor in much detail with the balancing required where employer policies relating to e-
mail and Internet clash with the privacy concerns of employees. Even so, and even though most 
cases have dealt with the fairness of dismissal of employees who abused e-mail and Internet 
systems, these cases already make it clear that an employer has an important interest in the 
integrity of its information systems and that these interests typically will trump those of the 
employee. 
4.3 Most recent cases on monitoring pending the implementation of the Protection of Personal 
Information Bill of 2009: 
Fredericks v Jo Barkett Fashions [2012] 1 BALR 28 (CCMA) 
An employee working as an administrative assistant for a fashion company was dismissed after 
the respondent's witness, Ms Alex Barkett, General Manager, testified under oath that it was 
brought to her attention that the applicant was publishing derogatory statements on her facebook 
page.337 She opened the applicant's page and found that it was indeed true.338 The applicant made 
several remarks which were horrific and disturbing in that the applicant even went to an extent of 
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calling her names.339 It was argued that, the remarks were made known to the general public and 
the implications would have affected 90 employees and key customers which generates the 
revenue for the company.340 It was further argued, the applicant did not show any respect to her 
as the manager and the company itself.341 After a thorough investigation, as facebook is a new 
concept, the applicant was charged and an independent chairperson conducted the hearing fairly 
which led to a dismissal of the applicant.342The respondent moreover, argued that, the applicant 
contravened the provisions of her contract although there was no specific policy concerning 
Facebook usage in the company, in that she published derogatory statements about the company 
and the general manager.343 
The applicant counter argued she felt that the dismissal was unfair and the company was 
supposed to use corrective measures other than to dismiss her as she feels that it was too harsh.344 
The employee argued her total circumstances were not considered since she asked for an apology 
for using facebook as a platform as she had issues in as far as what the General Manager (Alex) 
said about her after she lost a child.345 It was her evidence that her constitutional right of privacy 
was infringed. The dismissal of Nadia Fredericks by Jo Barkett Fashions was held to be 
substantively fair.346 
Sedick& another v Krisray (Pty) Ltd CCMA WECT13321-10, [2011] JOL 27445 (CCMA) 
Employees (De Reuck and Sedick) were employed by a fashion accessories company (Krisray 
(Pty) Ltd) as an Operations Manager and Bookkeeper respectively.347 The company’s Marketing 
Manager (Ms Coetzee) logged into her Facebook account and navigated to De Reuck’s facebook 
page, because she wanted to send her a friend request.348 She was able to see everything on the 
employee’s Facebook wall without being given access as a friend and what she saw included 
posts by Sedick and other employees. 349  Ms Coetzee found offensive comments about the 














company and its management in posts on the employees’ Facebook walls.350 Another employee 
referred to Ms Coetzee and her brother in a post as, “2 dumb brats runnin a Mickey Mouse 
business” Sedick referred to the Director of the company as, “a very ugly man with a dark 
soul”.351 
After having gone through the comments as per the bundle, it was clear that the applicant knew 
what she was doing and had negatively impacted on the image of the company and it’s General 
Manager. 352  As to her claims of her right of privacy being infringed, the Regulation of 
Interception of Communication Act 70 of 2002 provides that any person may intercept any 
communication unless the person is intercepting that information or communication for 
committing an offence.353 It was held that Facebook can be accessed by any person who has an 
account and it is up to the Facebook user to restrict access to their pages.354 The applicant did not 
do so, her page was open to the public and anybody could access it.355 It was further held that 
corrective measures in circumstances of this case would not be a viable decision, her actions 
were not justifiable and she used the wrong platform to address her grievance, therefore, 
dismissal was fair. 356 
Smith and Partners in Sexual Health (Non-Profit) CCMA (WECT 13711-10) 
 An employee, Ms Smith, was employed as the administration assistant, one of her duties was to 
check the company Gmail account and forward emails to the company’s new email address.357 
The company CEO (Ms de Lora) wanted to log into the company Gmail account to check 
whether any emails had come in while Ms Smith was on leave.358 Ms Smith forgot to sign out of 
her personal Gmail account and the CEO ended up looking at Ms Smith’s personal account 
instead.359 The CEO did not realise that she was looking at the employee’s personal emails at 













first; however, she worked it out once she tried to look at them again and ended up logging into 
the business account.360 
Ms De Lora dismissed Ms Smith because she found emails in her personal account in which the 
employee complained about her job, complained about Ms De Lora and told people outside of 
the organisation about its daily activities.361 
Ms Smith took her employer to the CCMA for unfair dismissal. She argued that her employer 
had intercepted her private Internet based emails on Gmail unlawfully; the employer’s actions 
were not justified by our monitoring law, the Regulation of Interception of Communication and 
Provision of Communication-Related Information Act, 70 of 2002 (“RICA”); employer’s actions 
infringed her Constitutional right to privacy; and that the emails that her employer sought to rely 
on were not admissible as evidence.362 
The question answered by this case was, when can an email be considered the “private” property 
of the employee and not be capable of being monitored by the employer?363 The answer to the 
question was held to be ‘when it’s your own email’.364 It was further held that, viewed from the 
employee’s perspective your own email is that email that is stored or hosted with a service 
provider with whom you have a contract. 365  Secondly, where an employer: owns its email 
infrastructure (e.g. owns its own hardware and runs its own email exchange server) and provides 
a user with an email address to use at work; or does not own its own email infrastructure, but 
instead uses a hosted email infrastructure which it pays a fee per user to use, and provides each 
user with an email address, the default position would be that all emails that a user sends or 
receives are not private.366 
In conclusion, South Africa now has legislation directly regulating the monitoring of employees 
in the workplace. This was not always the case, as IMPA did not specifically provide for such 
interception and monitoring, although it arguable was broad enough to include Internet and e-
mail communications in its scope of application. This is a clear indication of the challenges 










technological developments create for the law in general, and privacy in particular .In the Smith 
case, the court appeared to be leaning in the direction of drawing a distinction between whether 
the employer owns the hardware that makes up the email infrastructure (where the email 
would not be private) and where the employer does not own that hardware (where the email 
























The right to privacy has developed over time because in the beginning it used to be recognised 
under the ambit of the right to dignity but now it is a right with its own self recognition. The 
right to privacy in South Africa is recognised in the Bill of Rights specifically section 14 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. Although recognised by the Constitution it is not 
an absolute right because it can be limited through application of section 36 of the Constitution 
which is the limitation clause. Case law over the years has also established that for one’s right to 
privacy to be upheld one must have had a legitimate expectation of his/her privacy right not 
being infringed. 
There are a number of legislative provisions which protect the right to privacy by regulating 
monitoring of employees internet, telephone and email correspondence in the workplace directly 
and indirectly. The interception and Prohibition of Monitoring Act came into effect before the 
interim Constitution and it was the first piece of legislation which concerned monitoring of email 
and internet communications. Its purpose was both to prohibit and authorise the monitoring of 
communications and conversations. The main aim and purpose of this piece of legislation was 
the monitoring and prohibition of interception of telephone conversations. The shortfall that led 
to its repeal was that it did not deal adequately of monitoring of new technology especially 
email. The IMPA Act was succeeded by the Regulation of the Interception of Communications 
and Provisions of Communications Related Information Act. RICPCIA recognises three 
instances where interception of communications can be lawful, where one of the parties to the 
communication have given their consent, where one party to the communication is involved in 
the interception and if the interception is carried out in the ordinary course of business. This 
legislation highlighted that employees did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
workplace and if they do their employer interests can outweigh privacy. Cases heard under this 
Act seem to be pointing to the fact that the employer’s right to protect the integrity of its 
information trumps the employees right to privacy. The Protection Of Personal Information Act 
4 of 2013 enactment is going to bring about a significant protection of individuals and 
organisations protection of personal information. Individuals will have the ability to ask 
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organisations to account for the exploitation of their personal information unlike in recent years 
legislation. 
The reasons formulated as to why employers monitor the internet, telephone and email 
correspondence of their employees is aimed at ensuring productivity and efficiency in the 
workplace. Monitoring of employee email, internet and telephone correspondence in the 
workplace brings about into play two competing interests which are, the employers need to run 
his business as he/she sees fit and the employees right to privacy. Restrictions on privacy in the 
workplace also serve to create an increase in economic performance. The law treats both the 
employee’s right to privacy and the employer’s right to monitor as important. It is not set in 
stone that the courts will rule in favour of the employer or employee in a given case but as to 
which right is to be limited depends on the facts of each case. The invention of new technology 
each day increases the need for the employer to put in place measures for the monitoring of 
employee email, telephone and internet so as to curb the risk brought about by these devices. So 
as to create a balance between the two conflicting rights of the employer and employee new 
statutory laws are implemented to regulate monitoring so as to provide for both the needs of the 
employer and employee for example the Protection of Personal Information Act is said to be the 
employees champion because it is going to make organisations more accountable for the 
exploitation of the employee’s right to privacy. 
Although it is not law many cases as discussed in this paper make it clear that an employer has 
an important interest in the integrity of its information systems and that these interests typically 
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